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Neural systems adapt to background levels of stimu-
lation. Adaptive gain control has been extensively
studied in sensory systems but overlooked in
decision-theoretic models. Here, we describe
evidence for adaptive gain control during the serial
integration of decision-relevant information. Human
observers judged the average information provided
by a rapid stream of visual events (samples). The
impact that each sample wielded over choices
depended on its consistency with the previous
sample, with more consistent or expected samples
wielding the greatest influence over choice. This
bias was also visible in the encoding of decision
information in pupillometric signals and in cortical
responses measured with functional neuroimaging.
These data can be accounted for with a serial
sampling model in which the gain of information
processing adapts rapidly to reflect the average of
the available evidence.INTRODUCTION
Optimal choices require information to be evaluated appropri-
ately and combined without loss (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Gold
and Shadlen, 2001; Wald and Wolfowitz, 1949). For example,
an accurate medical diagnosis is made by considering all of
the relevant symptoms, weighting each by the reliability with
which it predicts a suspected condition. This intuition forms a
mainstay of philosophical reflections on decision-making
(Peirce, 1878) and is formalized in mathematically optimal
models of choice behavior, such as those based on serial inte-
gration of likelihoods (Ma et al., 2006; Wald and Wolfowitz,
1949; Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Empirically, this ideal observer
framework accounts for choices, response latencies, and neural
activity observed during psychophysical tasks involving inte-
grating noisy information over time, such as the random dot mo-
tion paradigm (Beck et al., 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2007).
However, unlike psychophysical judgments of stationary sen-
sory signals, real-world choices (such as those faced by medicalpractitioners) often require the integration of variable, heteroge-
neous, or otherwise incommensurable information. Linear inte-
gration of highly variable information on an absolute scale poses
a challenge for the nervous system, because it requires coding
units to represent information across a broad dynamic range.
One efficient solution is to encode information relative to the
local context by adapting the gain of neuronal firing to the range
of information available over the short or long term (Barlow,
1961; Carandini and Heeger, 2012; Webb et al., 2003). For
example, the visual system adapts to light levels over the diurnal
cycle (Bartlett, 1965) or to stimulus contrast over the recent trial
history (Greenlee andHeitger, 1988). In cortical neurons, adapta-
tion is mediated both by habituation (Carandini and Ferster,
1997) and by normalization mechanisms that scale the response
of a neuron by that of its neighbors (Carandini and Heeger, 2012;
Heeger, 1992). Beyond the sensory cortices, adaptive mecha-
nisms may allow relative coding of utility, leaving economic
choices vulnerable to the influence of local context (Louie and
Glimcher, 2012; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Tremblay and Schultz,
1999) and provoking preference reversals and other violations
of axiomatic rationality (Louie et al., 2013; Soltani et al., 2012).
However, adaptive gain control has been overlooked in canoni-
cal models of information integration during perceptual choice
(Bogacz et al., 2006; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).
Here,wedescribe a serial samplingmodel of perceptual choice
in which the gain of information processing adapts rapidly to the
changing statistics of the environment. We used this adaptive
gain model to understand the behavior of humans categorizing
a rapidstreamofvisual gratingson thebasisof their angleof orien-
tation. Humans performing this task exhibited two suboptimal
biases inchoicebehavior, reflected in the impact that eachgrating
(‘‘sample’’) wieldedover the eventual decision. First, samples that
carried similar decision information to their predecessor wielded
greater influence on choice, even independent of their physical
appearance (consistency bias). Second, samples that occurred
later in the stream were also more diagnostic of choice (recency
bias; Tsetsos et al., 2012b). Simulations reveal that these two
biases are both predicted by the adaptive gain model. Moreover,
the gain of encoding of decision information in pupil diameter and
in cortical brain responses followed tightly the predictions of the
model. These findings provide evidence for remarkably rapid
and flexible gain control during decision making, define limits on
the optimality of human judgment, and place a strong constraint
on computational models of perceptual choice.Neuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1429
Figure 1. Experimental Design and Model
(A) Category-level averaging task. Rapid visual
streams of eight oriented Gabor patterns were
presented at 4 Hz. Participants reported whether,
on average, the tilt of the eight elements fell closer
to the cardinal or diagonal axis.
(B) Schematic illustration of the adaptive transfer
function for an example trial. Left panel: samples
(blue dots, shaded by their order of occurrence
from light to dark) are drawn from a distribution
(inverted blue Gaussian) and characterized by a
decision update value (position on x axis). With
each new sample, the transfer function (gray lines)
shifts fractionally in the direction of the latest
sample. Right panel: illustrative gain (difference on
y axis) from two samples (red lines) under two
different transfer functions (light and dark gray
lines). Gain is maximal when the inflection point of
the transfer function coincides with the expecta-
tion of the sampling distribution (inverted blue
Gaussian), i.e., given the dark gray curve.
See also Supplemental Information and Figure S1.
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Adaptive Gain Model
Consider a task in which observers view a fixed number of
discrete samples of evidence occurring in succession (see Fig-
ure 1B), with each sample k characterized by decision update
DUk that can vary continuously between 1 and +1. The
observers’ task is to judge whether the aggregate information
SDUk is greater or less than zero. This ‘‘expanded judgment’’
task is sometimes known as the weather prediction task (Pol-
drack et al., 2001; Yang and Shadlen, 2007). In this task, the
optimal policy is to integrate the log-likelihood ratio associated
with each sample, which is equivalent to basing choices on
the sum of decision values SDUk. The adaptive gain model
proposes that each decision update passes through a nonlinear
(sigmoidal) transfer function f:
dDUk = fðDUkjxk1; sÞ (Equation 1)
where xk corresponds to the point of maximal gain during
processing of sample k and s corresponds to the shallowness
of the nonlinearity (step-like for s = >0, linear for s = >N). A
formal description of the transfer function is given in the Supple-
mental Information available online (Figure S2).
In the adaptive gain model, after each sample k, the point of
maximal gain xk is updated according to the feature information
provided by sample k using a delta rule with learning rate a:
xk = xk1 +a,ðDUk  xk1Þ (Equation 2)
Thus, after each sample k, the inflection point xk of the transfer
function f is progressively adjusted toward the current expecta-
tion of the sampling distribution (Figure 1B). Because the
gradient of the transfer function is steepest at this point, samples
arriving at, or close to, this point will be most diagnostic of
choice. One important corollary of this model is that, across
samples, observers become most influenced by information1430 Neuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.with the highest probability of occurrence. Figure S1A displays
how the shape of the transfer function adapts for variations in
inflection point xk and s.
Finally, the output decision updates are subjected to a noisy
sum with signal-to-noise ratio b and compared to a fixed cate-
gory boundary falling at b0 (zero for the ideal observer):
Pðrespond>0Þ=F
 
b,
X8
k= 1
dDUk + b0
!
(Equation 3)
where P(respond > 0) corresponds to the model-predicted
probability of responding that the sequence is greater than
zero and F() corresponds to the probit decision rule, i.e., the
Gaussian cumulative density function. The choice of this deci-
sion rule is motivated by the idea that each sample of evidence
DUk is corrupted by additive Gaussian noise whose SD relates
inversely to the corresponding b parameter.Adaptive Gain Model: Simulations
We generated simulated streams of eight samples of evidence
(range: 1:1) and asked the model to classify them. For illustra-
tion, we began with an arbitrary set of parameters (b = 1; s = 0.5;
a = 0.5). The point of maximal gain xk was initialized to zero and
updated according to Equation 2.
When decisions are made on the basis of multiple samples of
evidence, decisions may rely more heavily on the information
provided by some samples than others. We thus used logistic
regression to characterize the impact that each sample had on
binary choices made by the model (and, subsequently, humans).
Our regression model comprised a total of 15 predictors in addi-
tion to an intercept term. The first eight predictors encoded the
decision information for each of the eight samples (DUk) in order
of occurrence, with the resulting coefficients (we call these
‘‘sample’’ coefficients) wk reflecting the weight that each of
the eight successive samples wielded over the choice. The
Figure 2. Adaptive and Static Model Prop-
erties
(A) Model predictions using a simulation with
arbitrary parameters. Estimated sample co-
efficients (blue) and consistency coefficients
(green) for both an adaptive (top panel/circles)
and static (bottom panel/triangles) version of the
model.
(B) Strength of recency (top panel) and consis-
tency (bottom panel) biases, shown for both the
adaptive (a = 0.5; filled circles) and static (a = 0;
filled triangles) version of the model, for a range of
s values controlling the gain of the nonlinear
transfer function.
(C) Heatmaps showing predicted biases under a
broad range of transfer function slope (s) and
learning rate (a) values. Red/yellow coloring shows
positive values; blue/cyan shows negative values.
Left panel: recency bias (DU5–8–DU1–4) is positive
for learning rates greater than 1. Right panel:
consistency bias is mostly negative for learning
rates greater than 1.
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at identifying how information in samples 2–8 was upweighted or
downweighted as a function of its disparity with previous infor-
mation. To this end, we defined a new quantity d(DU)k that en-
coded the absolute dissimilarity in decision information between
each sample (excluding the first) and its predecessor (we set
d(DU)0 = 0):
dðDUÞk = jDUk  DUk1j (Equation 4)
Predictors 9–15 encoded the interaction between DUk and
d(DU)k. The coefficients associated with these predictors (we
call these ‘‘consistency’’ coefficients) would be positive if dissim-
ilarity between successive samples led to upweighting and
negative if dissimilarity led to downweighting.
Thus, the full regression model, including the two per-sample
predictors described above, was defined as follows:
Pðrespond>0Þ=F
 X8
k= 1

wk +w
d
k,dðDUÞk

,DUk + b0
!
(Equation 5)
For the simulated data, the estimated sample coefficients wk,
and consistency coefficients wdk are plotted against their corre-
sponding sample k in Figure 2A (left panel). These simulations
reveal two clear predictions made by the adaptive gain model.
First, although sample coefficients are all positive, indicating
that each contributed to the decision, those for later samples
are more positive than those for earlier samples—a ‘‘recency’’
bias (Figure 2A, left panel; blue circles). The adaptive gain model
thus predicts that later-occurring evidencewill carrymoreweightNeuron 81, 1429–1441in the decision. In the model, this occurs
because the inflection point of the trans-
fer function takes some time to converge
to the mean of the sampling distribution,
and so later-occurring samples will, on
average, be more likely to fall in zone ofmaximum gain, where samples are more diagnostic of choice.
Second, ‘‘consistency’’ coefficients were all negative (Figure 2A,
left panel; green circles). Thus, themodel predicts that observers
will tend to disregard samples that differ strongly from their pre-
decessor, because on average these will fall further from the
inflection point of the adapting likelihood function. We call this
a ‘‘consistency bias,’’ as it reflects the difficulty of evaluating
successive samples with respect to a common standard.
For comparison, in Figure 2A (right panel), we include the
predictions of a ‘‘static’’ model, which is identical in all respects
except that the learning rate a is set to zero (b = 1; s = 0.5; a = 0).
This model reduces to a standard psychophysical model with a
nonlinear transfer function (Naka and Rushton, 1966). As can be
seen, the coefficients wk associated with DUk (encoding the
weight given to each sample; blue triangles) are positive but do
not increase over time, yielding no recency bias. Moreover, the
coefficients wdk associated with DUk , d(DU)k (encoding the
up- or downweighting of samples 2–8; green triangles) are close
to zero, revealing no consistency bias. Thus, the effects
described in Figure 2A (left panel) depend on the adaptation of
the transfer function across samples.
Next, we verified that these predictions are not specific to the
parameterization chosen above. In Figure 2C, we summarize
these two biases for values of s and a in the range 1:1, setting
the signal-to-noise level (b) to 1 (adding different levels of noise
had no qualitative effect on these predictions). In the left panel,
we calculate the recency bias as the difference between sample
coefficients for late (DU5–8) and early (DU1–4) samples and plot
this summary measure for differing values of s and a. Of note,
these are positive for values of a > 0 (red/yellow shading),, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1431
Figure 3. Behavioral Results and Model
Predictions
(A) Experiment 1.
(B) Experiment 2.
Regression coefficients from behavioral data
(filled color circles), together with adaptive
model predictions (lines), estimated using a
multivariate logistic regression of choice against
a linear combination of factors. Blue dots
and lines: sample coefficients wk for the eight
sample decision updates (wk). Green dots and
lines: consistency coefficients wdk indicating
the influence of disparity between samples.
Solid lines plot model predictions based on
analytically derived parameter values, fitting
against choice data. Dashed lines plot model
predictions based on an exhaustive search over
parameter space, minimizing the mean squared error between behavioral and model parameter estimates. Error bars indicate ±1 SE.
See also Supplemental Information and Figure S3.
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tion is updated toward the current expectation. By contrast, they
are negative (showing a primacy effect) for values of a < 0, i.e.,
when the transfer function is updated away from the current
expectation. This ability to predict primacy and recency shows
the generality of the model and potential to capture a range of
different weighting profiles, under distinct parameterizations. In
the right panel, we show the average of the seven consistency
coefficients under different parameterizations. Similarly, these
are all negative for values of a > 0 (blue/cyan shading). The adap-
tive model displays both recency and consistency biases for a
range of s values, maximal as s approaches 0 (i.e., when the
transfer function is most step-like), whereas the static model fails
to display either of these biases (Figure 2B). Together, these
simulations show that the recency and consistency biases do
not depend on specific values of s or a (a > 0) and that both
biases can be reversed via the introduction of a negative learning
rate, which shifts the point of maximum gain away from the
expectation of the sampling distribution.
Experiment 1: Human Behavioral Data
We tested the predictions of the adaptive gain model by asking
23 healthy human observers to classify a stream of eight visual
gratings (presented at 4 Hz) as more ‘‘cardinal’’ or ‘‘diagonal,’’
providing feedback according to their aggregate decision
update value (Figure 1A). The decision update for each sample
k (the quantity that we term DUk) depended nonlinearly on angle
of orientation, with gratings whose orientation was closer to 0 or
90 providing evidence for one response and those closer to 45
or 45 contributing evidence in favor of the opposite response
(Figure S1B; Supplemental Information). This task has the
appealing property that decision updates are orthogonal to
perceptual information, because very different angles (e.g., 10
and 80) offer the same decision information, allowing us to
distinguish any sequential effects in decision making from low-
level perceptual priming (Wyart et al., 2012a) (the independence
of DUk from perceptual information is shown in Figure S1B).
Participants responded with a key press following presentation
of all eight samples, allowing us to test (using the regression-
based approach described in Equation 5) for the presence of1432 Neuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.recency and consistency biases predicted by the adaptive gain
model.
Using the regression approach described above to assess
the impact that each sample had on human decisions, coeffi-
cients were less positive for early (k < 5) than late (k > 4) samples
(Figure 3A, left panel; blue circles; t(22) = 5.38; p < 0.001). Consis-
tency coefficients for items 2–8 were on average negative-going
(Figure 3A, left panel; green circles; t(22) = 2.05; p < 0.05). Thus,
human participants showed both the recency and consistency
biases predicted by the model. Furthermore, the human data
also reveal the existence of a ‘‘belief compatibility’’ bias, reflect-
ing the compatibility with the running average of the sequence,
which displays the same qualitative pattern as the consistency
bias and which is also predicted by the adaptive gain model
(see Supplemental Information for details and Figure S3).
Additionally, the recency and consistency biases displayed by
human participants were present in both early and late periods
of the experiment (Figure S3) and did not depend on knowledge
of the sequence length, as demonstrated in an additional be-
havioral experiment (Figure S3).
We fit the adaptive gain model to the data by searching for the
parameterization that best predicted human choices given the
input sequence (values of DUk), i.e., maximizing the model log-
likelihood corresponding to the probability of a model using a
set of generative parameters b, s, and a to have produced the
observed behavioral data. Details of this Bayesian model fitting
approach are described in full in the Supplemental Information.
Model choices obtained using the resulting maximum likelihood
parameters (b = 0.63;s = 0.67; and a = 0.26) were then subjected
to the same regression analyses as human data and are overlaid
on Figure 3A (solid blue and green lines). As can be seen, the
model is able to capture the recency and consistency biases
both qualitatively and quantitatively. The regression analysis
yields 15 parameter estimates (Figure 3A), and model predic-
tions fall within the 95% confidence intervals produced by the
human behavioral data for all but four of them. Additionally, we
searched exhaustively over different values of the three para-
meters s, b, and a for themodel parameterization that minimized
the difference with the human regression coefficients (dashed
blue and green lines in Figure 3A). The resulting parameters
Neuron
Adaptive Gain Control during Perceptual Choice(b = 0.7; s = 0.63; and a = 0.2) provided an equally good fit to the
human data.
The statistically significant recency and consistency biases in
human behavior militate in favor of the adaptive gain model over
its static counterparts. However, to compare these models more
formally, fitting the static model to the data using the same
maximum likelihood criteria described above produced a poorer
fit compared to its adaptive model counterpart (shown in Fig-
ure S3; Supplemental Information), even when the extra param-
eter was taken into account by using the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) (see Experimental Procedures). In addition,
directly comparing the residual mean squared error (MSE)
between behavioral parameter estimates for each subject and
model predictions, we found that the adaptive model was a
significantly better fit to the data than its static counterpart
(t(22) = 4.12; p < 0.0005). This comparison shows that the adjust-
ment of the slope of the transfer function alone is not sufficient to
account for the biases observed in human choice behavior. The
failure of the static model to account for human performance
also demonstrates the suboptimality of integration in our task,
because the static model describes the performance of a
Bayesian ideal observer with or without input noise (Figure S2
and text).
Experiment 1: Pupillometry
Traditional theories (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005) and recent
evidence (Cohen and Aston-Jones, 2005; Eldar et al., 2013; Gil-
zenrat et al., 2002; Nassar et al., 2012) have pointed to pupil
diameter as a correlate of the gain of information processing
during decision making. Pupil diameter is partly driven by
arousal-linked changes in the neural response of the locus co-
eruleus, which in turn modulates cortical activity via diffuse
noradrenergic projections (Usher et al., 1999). We thus turned
to pupillometric data recorded during experiment 1 to investigate
how moment-by-moment changes in pupil diameter following
the presentation of sample k were predicted by its decision infor-
mation DUk and how this correlation was modulated by consis-
tency between current and previous sample d(DU)k.
Pupil diameter changes slowly in response to cognitive and
attentional factors, typically peaking 1 to 2 s poststimulus, but
its subsecond fluctuations can be disambiguated using a linear
regression approach similar to that often employed to model
the sluggish blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response
(Nassar et al., 2012; Wierda et al., 2012; Zylberberg et al.,
2012). Having successfully recorded pupil diameter from 20 of
the 23 participants, we created a regression model in which
the pupil response at each time point t following sample k was
modeled as a linear combination of jDUkj (reflecting the strength
of the current evidence sample, associated with coefficients
wk,dt) and jDUkj , d(DU)k (reflecting how the neural encoding of
evidence strength depends on its consistency with the previous
evidence sample, associated with coefficients wk,dt
d):
pupil ðtk +dtÞ=

wk;dt +w
d
k;dt,dðDUÞk

,jDUkj
+wsumdt ,
X8
j= 1
DUj
+ edt (Equation 6)where pupil(tk + dt) is the normalized and base-lined pupil size
at time dt following the onset of sample k (the final term encodes
the mean decision information on that trial, ensuring that fluctu-
ations in pupil diameter reflect sample-specific changes in DUk
and not the global difficulty of the trial). The coefficients of this
regression across time provide the time course of encoding of
decision information in pupillometric signals (wk,dt) and the
modulation of this encoding by the consistency of decision infor-
mation contained in consecutive samples (wdk,dt). The evidence
contained in the first sample (DU1) was excluded from the
analysis to avoid interference from possible transient responses
at the beginning of the sequence, unrelated to the decision
update. These encoding functions, averaged across samples,
are plotted in blue and green, respectively, in Figure 4B. Pupil
diameter tended to grow with increasing decision information,
with a peak in encoding at 1,140 ms after sample onset (t(19) =
3.5; p < 0.001; blue trace). Critically, however, and consistent
with behavioral findings, this encoding was negatively modu-
lated by the difference to the previous sample d(DU)k—samples
whose predecessor provided very different decision information
were encoded more weakly in pupillary signals. This is shown by
plotting the coefficients (wdk,dt) associated with DUk $ d(DU)k,
which diverged negatively from zero (Figure 4B; green trace;
maximum significance at 2,000 ms after sample onset; t(19) =
3.0; p < 0.004). In other words, pupillary responses track fluctu-
ations in the strength of decision evidence and the reduced gain
of information processing when evidence is inconsistent with its
predecessor, that mirror those observed in behavior and are
predicted by the adaptive gain model. Demonstrating this effect
another way, in Figure 4C, we plotted the encoding of DUk in
pupil responses separately for samples with small and large
values of d(DU)k, i.e., that were similar/dissimilar to the previous
sample based on a median split. Encoding was stronger when
samples were more similar (full blue line) than when they were
different (faded blue line).
Previous models have accounted for recency effects in
perceptual categorization by assuming that integration is leaky,
with information dissipating gradually across the choice period
(Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wang, 2002). Our model of
behavior provides an alternative explanation for the recency
bias, suggesting that it is (at least in part) due to dampened infor-
mation gain for earlier samples, rather than exclusively by a
subsequent leak of the information. If this is indeed the case,
then momentary encoding of DUk in pupilk,t should be height-
ened for later samples. We thus averaged encoding curves for
early- (samples 2–4) and late-occurring (samples 5–8) samples
separately (see Experimental Procedures) and plotted them
separately (Figure 4D). Statistical comparison indicated that
they diverged reliably at about 1 s poststimulus, with stronger
encoding for later samples (t(19) = 1.78; one-tailed p < 0.05), as
predicted by the adaptive gain model.
Experiment 2: Human Behavioral Data
Changes in pupil diameter offer a proxy for variations in the
gain of cortical processing, but a more direct measure of brain
activity can be obtained using functional neuroimaging. We
thus asked a new cohort of 18 participants to perform the
same task while undergoing fMRI. Once again, observersNeuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1433
Figure 4. Pupil Dilation in Response to De-
cision Information
(A) Pupil dilation over the course of a trial ex-
pressed as the proportion change relative to a
presequence baseline level. Vertical lines repre-
sent the onset of the eight decision-relevant
samples.
(B) Regression coefficients showing the encoding
of decision information in pupil diameter
(Equation 6) for the time window 500 to
+2,500 ms relative to the onset of each sample.
Blue curves—coefficients for decision update wk.
Green coefficients for disparity interaction wdk.
Each curve reflects coefficients averaged across
samples 2–8. Colored horizontal bars indicate re-
gions of significance against baseline at the level
p < 0.05 uncorrected (light) and corrected (dark)
for multiple comparisons.
(C) Pupil dilation encoding time course of decision
update DUk divided into conditions of either small
or large d(DU)k—i.e., large or small shifts in deci-
sion space between the preceding (k  1) and
current (k) sample—divided on the basis of a
median split on d(DU)k. Colored horizontal bars
indicate regions of significant difference between
low and high d(DU)k at p < 0.05 uncorrected (light)
and corrected (dark) for multiple comparisons.
(D) Pupil encoding time course of decision update
DUk for early- (position 2–4) versus late-occurring
(position 5–8) samples. Shading around each line
indicates ±1 SEM.
See also Supplemental Information and Figure S4.
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judged whether the angles of orientation were (on average)
more cardinal or more diagonal. Regression coefficients for
wk and w
d
k are shown in Figure 3B. As can be seen, behavioral
data once again revealed a recency bias (t(18) = 3.9; p < 0.001)
and a consistency bias (green circles; t(18) = 4.6; p < 0.001),
similar to those observed in experiment 1. The best fits to
human choices (solid lines) and regression parameters them-
selves (dashed lines) reveal that the adaptive gain model can
approximate these very closely (parameters of the best-fitting
model were b = 0.5; s = 0.92; and a = 0.65). Model predictions
for 13 out of 15 parameter estimates fell within the 95% con-
fidence intervals of the behavioral data. Once again, the
adaptive model outperformed its static counterpart, in which
the learning rate was fixed at zero. Replicating the results of
experiment 1, the static model demonstrated significantly
larger residuals (t(18) = 4.67; p < 0.0002) and poorer fits to the
data, even after taking into account the extra parameter using
the BIC.
Experiment 2: fMRI Data
The main effect of stimulus onset in experiment 2 evoked
positive-going BOLD responses in a number of cortical regions,
including visual cortical zones, the lateral parietal and prefrontal
cortices, the presupplementary motor area, and anterior insular
cortex (AINS) (Figure S5; Tables S1–S3; Supplemental Informa-
tion). The main purpose of our experiment was to determine
how BOLD signals encoded information provided by each
stimulus (i.e., DUk) and how this encoding was modulated by1434 Neuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.the consistency between current and previous sample d(DU)k.
To this end, we focused on three cortical clusters that have
been implicated in perceptual category judgments in previous
neuroimaging studies (Filimon et al., 2013; Grinband et al.,
2006; Heekeren et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2009; Liu and Pleskac,
2011): the lateral parietal cortex (falling principally on the inferior
parietal lobule [IPL]), a region of the dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex comprising mainly the presupplementary motor area
stretching inferiorly to the anterior cingulate cortex (dMFC),
and the anterior insular cortex (Figure 5A, left, middle, and right
panels, respectively).
We analyzed imaging data for each region using a comparable
approach to that adopted for the eye-tracking data: extracting
fMRI time series aligned to stimulus onset for each trial allowed
us to regress the decision information for each sample DUk onto
the poststimulus BOLD signals, yielding one parameter estimate
per sample for each time point following the stimulus. We then
averaged these time courses across samples and plotted sepa-
rately for trials on which each of the two options (cardinal versus
diagonal) was chosen (blue lines in Figure 5B; see Experimental
Procedures). The resulting curves plot the extent to which deci-
sion information (e.g., relative evidence favoring cardinal over di-
agonal) was encoded in BOLD signals, both when participants
chose cardinal and when they chose diagonal.
BOLDðtk +dtÞ=

wk;dt +w
d
k;dt,dðDUÞk

,DUk
+wsumdt ,
X8
j= 1
DUj
+ edt (Equation 7)
Figure 5. fMRI Data
(A) Clusters selected as regions of interest: IPL,
dMFC, and AINS, rendered onto axial/sagittal
slices of the template brain of the Montreal
Neurological Institute at a threshold of p < 0.00001
uncorrected.
(B) Encoding of DUk (i.e., evidence favoring
cardinal) in BOLD signals as a function of time in
seconds (x axis) for trials on which cardinal (solid
blue line) or diagonal (dashed blue line) were
chosen. Shading around each line shows SEM.
Upper blue bars denote time points where en-
coding curves diverge significantly at p < 0.05.
a.u., arbitrary units.
(C) As for (B) but plotting consistency coefficients
wdk for BOLD signals. Green bars denote signifi-
cant time points.
(D) Plot of the difference between encoding for
each choice in (A) and (B). Blue lines: divergence
between encoding of DUk for the two choices.
Green lines: divergence between encoding of
DUk , d(DU)k for the two choices.
See also Supplemental Information, Figure S5,
and Tables S1–S3.
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regions encoding action values in reward-guided decision tasks
(Boorman et al., 2009). In Equation 7, BOLD(tk + dt) is the normal-
ized and base-lined BOLD response in each region at time dt
following the onset of sample k. The resulting coefficients are
shown in Figure 5B. Strong encoding of DUk as a function of
choice was observed in each of the three regions of interest,
as demonstrated by the divergence between wk,dt in BOLD
signals for trials with opposing choices (peak statistics; at
8–10 s poststimulus: IPL t(18) = 2.78, p < 0.007; dMFC t(18) =
4.06, p < 0.001; AINS t(18) = 7.22, p < 0.000001; blue traces
and bars in Figure 5B). In other words, BOLD signals in these
regions encoded decision-relevant activity in a fashion that pre-
dicted choices.
Next, building upon the analyses described above, we
assessed how the encoding of DUk in BOLD signals was modu-
lated by the recent history of stimulation. To this end, we esti-
mated regression coefficients for the interaction between DUk
and d(DU)k, i.e., the extent to which this encoding of DUk was
heightened or dampened according to consistency with the
previous sample. Coefficients for this regression were reversed
with respect to those for wk,dt (green traces in Figure 5C), consis-
tent with the negative coefficients observed for wdk,dt in the
behavioral and eye-tracking data. This finding thus reveals a reli-
able mitigation of DUk encoding in all three regions when infor-Neuron 81, 1429–1441mation diverges between samples (peak
statistics; at 2–5 s poststimulus: IPL
t(18) = 1.87, p < 0.05; dMFC t(18) = 2.02,
p < 0.03; AINS t(18) = 2.38, p < 0.02; green
bars in Figure 5C). Indeed, plotting the
relative encoding (for the two responses)
of DUk and DUk ,d(DU) in the two choices
revealed reliable positive- and negative-
going coefficients that matched thoseobtained for behavioral data (blue and green bars in Figure 5D).
In other words, encoding of decision information in the BOLD
signal is modulated by the consistency between current and
previous decision information.
Experiment 3: Reanalysis of EEG Recordings
In an earlier published study (Wyart et al., 2012a), we recorded
electroencephalogram (EEG) data while participants performed
the same cardinal/diagonal task. In these data, DUk was en-
coded in EEG signals peaking at 500 ms poststimulus over the
parietal cortex. These data afforded the opportunity to test
how the encoding of DUk was modulated by d(DU)k. We found
strong modulation between 400 and 500 ms poststimulus
(t(14) = 4.7; p < 0.001), consistent with the encoding time course
for DUk. These results are described in Figures 6 and S6.
Experiment 4: Manipulation of Presentation Order
Statistical comparison strongly supported the view that the gain
function adapts rapidly over time. Nevertheless, we decided to
pit the static and adaptive versions of the model against each
other in a further experiment, for which the two models made
different predictions. We created a version of the cardinal/
diagonal discrimination task on which each trial consisted of
just four samples, with two favoring cardinal and two favoring
diagonal. This allowed us to systematically manipulate the order, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1435
Figure 6. EEG Response to Decision Infor-
mation
(A) EEG-encoding time course of decision infor-
mation. Blue—decision update coefficients wk.
Green—disparity interaction coefficients wdk.
Curves display parameter coefficients from the
multivariate regression of EEG signal amplitude
against a linear combination of decision factors
(Equation S9) for the time window 200
to +800 ms relative to the onset of each sample.
Each curve reflects coefficients averaged across
samples 2–8. Colored horizontal bars indicate re-
gions of significance at the level p < 0.05 uncor-
rected for both wk (blue) and w
d
k (green).
(B) Time course of decision update DUk divided
into conditions of either small (dark blue) or large
(light blue) interitem disparity across decision
space (d(DU)k), divided on the basis of a median
split. Colored horizontal bars indicate significance
against baseline and black bars indicate regions of
significant difference between low and high d(DU)k,
both at p < 0.05 uncorrected.
(C) EEG-encoding topographies of decision infor-
mation at 500 ms following the corresponding
element. Blue—decision update DUk. Green—
disparity interaction DUk , d(DU)k. Large dots
indicate parietal electrodes of interest (CP3, CPz,
CP4, P3, Pz, P4, and POz).
(D) EEG-encoding topographies for DUk divided into conditions of either small (left) or large (right) interitem disparity across decision space, divided
on the basis of a median split. Same conventions as in (C).
See also Supplemental Information and Figure S6.
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(cardinal [C] or diagonal [D]) in three discrete conditions: alter-
nating (C-D-C-D or D-C-D-C), pairs (C-C-D-D or D-D-C-C),
and sandwich (C-D-D-C or D-C-C-D). The adaptive and static
gain models make very different predictions about how the
weights associated with decision information on samples 1–4
should vary as a function of the three conditions, with static
gain predicting no difference as a function of position in any of
the three conditions (Figure 7B, blue dots) and the adaptive
gain model predicting different patterns in each (Figure 7A, red
dots). These predictions are shown in Figure 7A alongside the
values obtained from a new cohort of human participants (n =
16) performing the task (filled gray bars). Comparing the MSE
between behavioral parameter estimates and those for the two
models produced significantly better fits for the adaptive
compared to the static model (t(14) = 3.0; p < 0.001). Strikingly,
the adaptive model is able to capture the large shifts in weighting
associated with each condition (Figure 7A). Subjecting these
four-item task data to the same analyses as experiments 1 and
2, we also observed the same recency (t(14) = 2.9; p < 0.02)
and consistency (t(14) = 3.9; p < 0.003). See also Figure S7 for
further behavioral results and model predictions from the four-
item task.
DISCUSSION
We used impact analyses in conjunction with an expanded judg-
ment task and functional neuroimaging to assess how humans
weighted decision-relevant information arriving in a rapid
stream. We observed evidence for two suboptimal biases. First,1436 Neuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.humans are unduly swayed by the samples that occurred shortly
prior to choice (recency bias). Second, their decisions are less
influenced by samples that carry dissimilar decision information
to their predecessor (consistency bias). These two biases, and
their neural expression in pupillometric and imaging data, are
accounted for by a model in which the gain of information
processing is adapted rapidly—within the time span of a single
trial—to coincide with the expectation of the distribution from
which information is sampled. This ‘‘adaptive gain’’ model thus
describes a gain control mechanism by which categorical infer-
ences become tuned to local statistics of decision-relevant infor-
mation, much as low-level sensory systems maximize gain by
adapting to background levels of stimulation (Bartlett, 1965; Car-
andini and Heeger, 2012; Fairhall et al., 2001).
The adaptive gain model makes two critical assumptions. The
first is that categorical responses involve a nonlinear transforma-
tion of decision information. This assumption is common to
standard psychophysical models of detection (Naka and Rush-
ton, 1966) and cognitive models of categorical perception
(Shepard, 1987; Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001) but has not
hitherto been a prominent feature of the serial sampling
approach. In categorization, the well-known heightened sensi-
tivity of observers close to a category boundary and the conse-
quent emergence of prototypical representations (perceptual
‘‘magnet’’ effects) is naturally modeled with a sigmoidal transfer
function of the sort adopted here (Bonnasse-Gahot and Nadal,
2008; Feldman et al., 2009). We have previously shown that
perceptual averaging of multiple, simultaneously occurring
visual items is best described with a model in which decision
information is transformed sigmoidally, leading to ‘‘robust
Figure 7. Adaptive and Static Model Predic-
tions for Different Sequence Classes
Decision-weighting profiles based on four-item
sequences (experiment 4), estimated using a
multivariate logistic regression of choice against a
linear combination of the four decision updates.
Behavioral weighting coefficients (filled gray bars)
are displayed for three cardinal (C)-diagonal (D)
sequence types: alternating (C-D-C-D or D-C-D-
C), pairs (C-C-D-D or D-D-C-C), and sandwich
(C-D-D-C or D-C-C-D). Adaptive gain model
parameter estimates from 20 separate runs are
plotted for both adaptive (A, red circles) and static
(B, blue circles), based on exhaustively searching
over parameter space, minimizing the MSE be-
tween behavioral and model parameter estimates.
Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
See also Supplemental Information and Figure S7.
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Adaptive Gain Control during Perceptual Choiceaveraging’’—reduced impact for samples of evidence that
diverge from the central tendency of the information (de Gardelle
and Summerfield, 2011).
The second assumption is that the point of maximal gain of
evidence processing (i.e., the steepest portion of the nonlinear
transfer function, f) adapts to the local statistics of stimulation.
As this happens, divergent or otherwise surprising evidence
will tend to fall in a portion of decision space with lower gain
(i.e., the shallower part of the transfer function) and thus
contribute more weakly to choice. It should be noted that ex-
pected evidence will lead to a weaker transduced signal in abso-
lute terms, consistent with the finding that expected stimuli elicit
globally reduced neural signals (Summerfield and Egner, 2009;
Summerfield et al., 2008; Todorovic et al., 2011). The biases
that we report are not merely due to perceptual priming, because
our cardinal/diagonal task carefully orthogonalizes the magni-
tude of the perceptual update (perceptual similarity between
adjacent samples) and decision update (difference in decision
value between two adjacent samples).
The adaptive gain mechanism ensures that information that
confirms (rather than disconfirms) the current belief will fall at
the point of maximal gain and come to have more impact on
the eventual choice. This furnishes the prediction—recently
confirmed—that observers should exhibit heightened sensitivity
to information that is more likely to occur, even when it is cued as
irrelevant to the task at hand (Wyart et al., 2012b). Moreover, the
stronger gain of processing of belief-congruent evidence pro-
vides a mechanism for understanding the confirmation bias, by
which belief-consistent evidence is given more credence, with
inconsistent evidence often downplayed or ignored (Nickerson,
1998). One study in which participants integrate discrete binary
samples of evidence reported that belief-consistent evidenceNeuron 81, 1429–1441tends to be under- rather than over-
weighted, but as noted by the authors of
that study, this may reflect the fact that,
once a criterial level of evidence was
achieved (i.e., three out of five suc-
cesses), the decision could already be
made with full certainty (de Lange et al.,2011). During speeded decision making, the presence of a
confirmatory bias may help to bring decisions about weak or
ambiguous evidence to a close, avoiding prolonged deliberation
and contributing to a maximization of overall reward rate (Bo-
gacz et al., 2006; Deneve, 2012; Drugowitsch et al., 2012).
In the current experiment, we provide evidence that gain
adaptation occurs within the time frame of a single trial. This
means that information occurring at the end of the trial is (on
average) processed with higher gain than information presented
early on. Our model thus provides one explanation for the
recency bias, whereby later-occurring evidence often holds
more sway over decisions, at least over the time scale of integra-
tion required here (Ossmy et al., 2013). However, whereas past
accounts of recent have invoked a forgetting process by which
information is lost over time (Usher and McClelland, 2001), the
adaptive gain model predicts that early samples should be
processed with weaker gain at the point of occurrence. Accord-
ingly, we found that pupillary signals, proposedly a generic index
of the gain of cortical processing, encoded decision information
more steeply for later relative to earlier samples. Nevertheless,
our model does not rule out leak as an additional contributor to
the recency bias, in particular where integration occurs over
several seconds (Tsetsos et al., 2012a).
Psychophysical judgments made by well-trained humans and
other primates have frequently been found to approach the stan-
dard of an ideal observer, i.e., one whose performance is limited
only by the variability in the stimulus (Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold
and Shadlen, 2001; Ma et al., 2006). Our model predicts that,
when input signals have low variance, for example, when the
evidence is a fixed quantity corrupted by noise, then perfor-
mance will approach optimality. This occurs because all of the
evidence falls within the narrow range for which gain is maximal,, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1437
Neuron
Adaptive Gain Control during Perceptual Choicewhere the transfer function is approximately linear. In other
words, our model makes the strong prediction that optimality
in perceptual choice will depend directly on the variability of
the input signal. This may help explain a long-standing discrep-
ancy in the decision sciences as to why humans appear to
perform optimally in perceptual classification tasks (Bogacz
et al., 2006) but are often inconsistent in their subjective prefer-
ences or economic choices (Kahneman et al., 1982; Vlaev et al.,
2011). Unlike most psychophysical judgments, real-world
choices often involve comparisons between dissimilar goods
or incommensurable options, which the adaptive gain model
predicts will be deviate from optimality. Indeed, recent theories
have appealed to another form of adaptive control—divisive
normalization—as a source of contextual bias driving decoy
effects and other preference instabilities (Louie et al., 2013).
More generally, adaptive gain mechanisms may have evolved
to ensure that, in a world in which the decision-relevant informa-
tion can change rapidly and unpredictably, the most probable
information is processed with the highest gain, sacrificing
optimality for computational efficiency (Carandini and Heeger,
2012; Wei and Stocker, 2012). We have previously shown that
rapid adaptation to the information in the previous trial guides
decision making when classification judgments are on nonsta-
tionary information (Summerfield et al., 2011).
One plausible mechanism by which adaptive gain control
could be implemented is by adjustments to the tuning of neurons
coding for expected information (Eldar et al., 2013). In the Sup-
plemental Information (Figure S2), we describe how our psycho-
physical model could be implemented in a biologically plausible
fashion as a population-coding model in which the tuning profile
across a population of neurons is adjusted so that the tuning of
neurons sensitive to expected information is sharpest. In this
population model, the consistency and recency biases fall out
of a very simple assumption: that sensory tuning, hence the
gain with which the next sample is processed, is determined
by the current state of activation in a subsequent layer that inte-
grates sensory information in an additive fashion. This model not
only predicts both the consistency and recency biases but also
correctly predicts that the encoding of decision information
(e.g., the correlation between DUk and neurophysiological
measures described here) will depend positively on the gain of
information processing and that fulfilled predictions per se would
elicit weaker neural responses, because a more select group of
sharply tuned neurons is activated by the input (Wiggs and Mar-
tin, 1998). This theory is consistent with the repeated finding that
BOLD signals to expected information tend to be suppressed
rather than enhanced (Summerfield and Egner, 2009; Summer-
field et al., 2008; Todorovic et al., 2011), as well as with a recent
report that despite this ‘‘expectation suppression,’’ more prob-
able signals can be decodedwith heightened fidelity from appro-
priate visual regions (Kok et al., 2012). As such, our model bears
close resemblance to ‘‘predictive coding’’ accounts of percep-
tion, in which expectations constrain the space over which
perceptual inferences can be made (Friston, 2005).
In conclusion, we describe evidence for adaptive gain control
during human decision making. Adaptive gain control provides a
mechanism for neural systems to adjust their range of sensitivity
to suit the information that is most likely to occur in the current1438 Neuron 81, 1429–1441, March 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.environment. During serial integration of decision information,
this mechanism prompts us to give most credence to expected
information and to downplay that which is outlying or unantici-
pated. This leads to maximal sensitivity to likely events but gives
rise to previously described suboptimalities, such as the recency
bias and consistency bias. This work unites two literatures on
priming and decision making and provides a framework for un-
derstanding decision making in a changing world.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Healthy human volunteers (n = 23, n = 18, n = 16, and n = 16 in experiments
1–4, respectively) gave informed consent to participate in the study. All re-
ported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological
or psychiatric impairment. The experiment followed local ethics guidelines.
Task
In all four experiments, participants viewed a stream of successive, centrally
presented Gabor patches (samples) with variable angle of orientation and
judged whether, on average, the orientation of the Gabors fell closer to the
cardinal axes or diagonal axes. Each sample k was assigned a decision value
DUk, whichmapped orientation onto decision value according to a ‘‘sawtooth’’
function, whose output ranged between +1 (90, 0, +90) and 1
(45, +45) with decision values of zero at the category boundaries (22.5,
67.5, 112.5, and 157.5). The sawtooth function is shown in Figure S1. Par-
ticipants received fully informative feedback according to whether they
correctly classified the stream as more cardinal (i.e., where SDUk > 0) or diag-
onal (where SDUk < 0).
Stimuli
Each stream consisted of eight samples (exp 1–3) or four samples (exp 4).
Each sample was a high-contrast Gabor patch (spatial frequency = 2 cycles
per degree; SD of Gaussian envelope = 1 degree) presented against a uniform
gray background. Samples were presented with an onset asynchrony of
250 ms (i.e., at 4 Hz). Sequences were preceded and succeeded by a mask
created from the linear superposition of the four cardinal and diagonal Gabor
patterns.
We collected response data differently in experiments 1/4 and 2/3. In exper-
iments 2 and 3, responses followed the onset of a centrally occurring green dot
that succeeded the backward mask and were made with a button (exp 2) or
key (exp 3) press with the left or right hand (category-response mappings
were counterbalanced across participants). Auditory feedback consisted of
an ascending (400 Hz/800 Hz; 100 ms/100 ms) or descending (800 Hz/
400 Hz; 100 ms/100 ms) tone signaling correct and incorrect responses,
respectively, that onset 250 ms after response. In experiments 1 and 4, we
used a different approach in which participants reported the integrated deci-
sion value on a continuous scale, allowing precise feedback to be adminis-
tered. Responses were cued by a screen divided vertically at the center,
and the response was made by clicking the mouse on the left or right of the
screen at a position corresponding to the integrated decision value. Immedi-
ately following response, visual feedback in the form of a vertical red line
was presented along the scale, indicating the position corresponding to the
objective average of all elements. Trials were separated by a blank interstim-
ulus interval of 1,500 ms (exp 1 and 3), 1,500–4,500 ms (exp 2), or 600 ms
(exp 4). Experiments consisted of 400 trials in blocks of 50 (exp 1 and 4),
450 trials in blocks of 90 (exp 2), or 672 trials in blocks of 96 (exp 3).
Design
In experiments 1 and 4, samples were drawn from one of two bimodal distribu-
tions, thereby ensuring an equal number of samples with more cardinal and
more diagonal orientation. Bimodal distributions were shifted positively or
negatively by a fixed value to control whether the sum of decision values
SDUk favored a cardinal or diagonal response. In experiment 2, sample orien-
tations were drawn from one of two sigmoidal distributions over decision
Neuron
Adaptive Gain Control during Perceptual Choicevalues (range 1 to +1). In experiment 4, the order of presentation of the four
Gabors was manipulated to create three discrete conditions: alternation (i.e.,
C-D-C-D or D-C-D-C; 50% of trials), pairs (C-C-D-D or D-D-C-C; 25% of
trials), and sandwich (C-D-D-C and D-C-C-D; 25% of trials), where C and D
represent samples favoring the cardinal or diagonal categories. Because deci-
sion values were sampled from normal or bimodel distributions, orientations
(perceptual values) were also drawn from distributions containing a subset
of all possible angles.
Apparatus and Recordings
Visual stimuli were generated and behavioral responses recorded using
Psychophysics-3 Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) in addition to custom
scripts written for MATLAB (MathWorks). Data from experiment 2 were ob-
tained in the fMRI scanner. Images were rear-projected into the scanner
bore via a custom-shielded Samsung 40 in liquid-crystal display screen
(LTA400HF) with a 60 Hz refresh rate. For all other experiments, observers
viewed a standard cathode ray tube monitor set to a display refresh rate of
either 85 Hz (exp 1) or 60 Hz (exp 3 and 4) with a resolution of 1024 3 768,
from a distance of 60–80 cm in a darkened room.
Eye Tracking
In experiment 1, pupil diameter was measured continuously throughout the
experiment using an Eyelink 1000 eye-tracking system, recordingmonocularly
at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. Calibration was performed twice, both before the
start of the experiment and after 200 trials. Subjects were instructed to mini-
mize head movement with the use of a chinrest. Data from three subjects
were discarded due to poor calibration.
Preprocessing and Encoding Analysis of Pupillometry Data
Blink artifacts were removed from the data using a custom interpolation
method in which spline fitting was performed based on pupil diameter
200 ms prior to blink onset and 200 ms after offset. Subsequently, high-
frequency components were removed (data smoothing) using a 50 ms sliding
window. Pupil measures were Z scored within trials, expressed relative to a
pretrial baseline period (280 to 0ms relative to sequence onset), and trimmed
using cutoffs of ±3. Finally, the data were Z scored across trials before being
entered into a general linear model (GLM). Three regressors were included in
the GLM (Equation 7; main text): the decision update DUk for each sample,
the mean DU for the eight samples comprising each sequence, and the inter-
action between DUk and the absolute difference in decision update between
each sample and its predecessor DUk ,d(DUk). Regressions were performed
on a sample-by-sample basis for pupil measures from500 to +2,000ms rela-
tive to sample onset. Following this, parameter estimates were then averaged
across samples. Significance testing of the pupil encoding curves was carried
out using a mass univariate approach, corrected for multiple comparisons
using a nonparametric random permutation test: after point estimate t-values
had been obtained at all time points and values of DUk and dilation traces were
shuffled 1,000 times to produce randomly paired data sets. We then per-
formed t tests across the entire sequence time course (500 to 2,000 ms peri-
stimulus time, in steps of 20 ms) for each shuffled data set, recording the
maximum test statistic from the entire time course. Point estimate statistics
that fell within the 95th percentile (p < 0.025 or p > 0.975) of this null distribution
based on shuffled values were deemed significant. For further detail on the
procedure, see Summerfield and Mangels (2005).
Preprocessing and Analysis of fMRI Data
Images were acquired in a 3 Tesla (Siemens TRIO) with a 32-channel head coil
using a standard echo-planar imaging sequence. Images were 64 3 64 3 36
volumes with voxel size 3 3 3 3 3 mm, acquired with a 2 s repetition time
and 30 ms echo time. Five runs of 300 volumes were obtained, each of which
lasted approximately 10 min and corresponded to one experimental block of
90 trials.
Preprocessing of the imaging data were carried out in SPM8 and included
correction for head motion and slice acquisition timing, followed by spatial
normalization to the standard template brain of the Montreal Neurological
Institute. Images were resampled to 4 mm cubic voxels and spatially
smoothed with a 10 mm full width at half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel.A 128 s temporal high-pass filter was applied in order to exclude low-
frequency artifacts. Temporal correlations were estimated using restricted
maximum likelihood estimates of variance components using a first-order
autoregressive model. The resulting nonsphericity was used to formmaximum
likelihood estimates of the activations.
All statistical analyseswere first conducted at the level of individual subjects,
and the resulting estimates were carried forward for a second stage involving
group-level inferences. We identified regions of interest using a simple design
matrix in which a finite impulse response was used to model each time point
after stimulus onset for all trials. We then plotted voxels that responded signif-
icantly (p < 0.00001; uncorrected) in the third bin (6 s) poststimulus. We chose
to focus on IPL, dMFC, and AINS because these regions have all been impli-
cated in perceptual decision making in recent fMRI studies. The purpose of
our study was not to make strong claims about the localization of regions
involved in decision making, but to use previously described regions to test
hypotheses pertaining to adaptive gain control.
BOLD time series were extracted from each region and averaged across
voxels. We then extracted overlapping epochs from 4 s to 24 s around the
onset of each stimulus and used a GLM approach similar to that for the pupil
and EEG data to assess how decision information was encoded in BOLD sig-
nals. Segregating trials into those where the participants’ choice was cardinal
versus diagonal, we regressed decision information (eight regressors encod-
ing DUk associated with each sample and seven regressors encoding DUk ,
d(DU)k) on the resulting BOLD signals at each time point separately. This
resulted in an intercept and 15 parameter estimates for each time point per
choice condition. We averaged across the eight estimates for DUk and the
seven estimates for DUk , d(DU)k and plotted the resulting average estimates
for each time point and choice (cardinal versus diagonal; Figures 5B and 5C).
These plots thus demonstrate the extent to which BOLD signals in each region
covaried with decision information (e.g., the extent to which the information
favored cardinal) and how this covariation was dampened by difference to
the previous sample, separately for trials on which the participants chose car-
dinal and where they chose diagonal.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
seven figures, and three tables and can be found with this article online at
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